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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the extent to which conjunction and disjunction can be rightfully
regarded as such, in the context of infectious logics. Infectious logics are peculiar many-
valued logics whose underlying algebra has an absorbing or infectious element, which is
assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. To
discuss these matters, we review the philosophical motivations for infectious logics due
to Bochvar, Hallde´n, Fitting, Ferguson and Beall, noticing that none of them discusses
our main question. This is why we finally turn to the analysis of the truth-conditions for
conjunction and disjunction in infectious logics, employing the framework of plurivalent
logics, as discussed by Priest. In doing so, we arrive at the interesting conclusion that —in
the context of infectious logics— conjunction is conjunction, whereas disjunction is not
disjunction.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background, motivation and aim
The aim of this paper is to discuss the extent to which conjunctions and disjunctions, appearing
in the context of what are nowadays called infectious logics (cf. [13, 22, 31]), can be rightfully
called conjunction and disjunction. Infectious logics are, in a nutshell, non-classical many-valued
logics that count with a truth-value which is assigned to a compound formula every time it is
assigned to at least one of its components. Thus, it is claimed that values behaving in this way
exhibit an infectious, contaminating or otherwise absorbing nature.
Salient examples of such logics are the {¬,∧,∨}-fragments, also called the “classical” frag-
ments, of Dmitri Bochvar’s and So¨ren Hallde´n’s logic of nonsense, presented in e.g. [5] and [18]
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respectively. What differentiates these logics (or, properly speaking, their classical fragments)
is that while Bochvar treats the contaminating value as undesignated, Hallde´n (although deriva-
tively, cf. [12, p. 345] and [22]) treats it as designated. From this and the absorbing nature of
this element it can be inferred that Bochvar’s logic is paracomplete, whereas Hallde´n’s logic is
paraconsistent. In fact, the classical fragment of Bochvar’s logic has been also discussed in the
relevant literature as Weak Kleene Logic Kw3 , while the classical fragment of Hallde´n’s logic has
been also independently discussed in the literature as Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic PWK.
As is easy to notice and as has been already pointed out in many works (e.g. [29]) this logics
are such that, respectively, ∨-Introduction and ∧-Elimination are invalid in them.
To carry out our present discussion we will scrutinize various motivations given for these
infectious logics, in order to determine whether or not the target binary operations are, after all,
legitimate disjunctions and conjunctions. To this end, for the case of paracomplete infectious
logics, we will consider Bochvar’s own nonsense-related account, Melvin Fitting’s epistemic
semantics [16], Thomas Ferguson’s computational interpretation [12, 14] and Jc Beall’s off-topic
reading [2]. Whereas for the case of paraconsistent infectious logics, we will consider Hallde´n’s
own nonsense-related account. We will argue that none of these allow to present a cogent reading
of disjunction and conjunction, but that an alternative account of the truth and falsity conditions
for these connectives, in terms of the discussion of Graham Priest’s plurivalent semantics carried
out in [29, 22], indeed does the work.
1.2 Preliminaries
Our language L consists of a finite set {¬,∧,∨} of propositional connectives and a countable set
Prop of propositional parameters. Furthermore, we denote by Form the set of formulas defined
as usual in L. We denote formulas of L by α, β, γ, etc. and sets of formulas of L by Γ, ∆, Σ,
etc.
Definition 1.1 (Univalent semantics) A univalent semantics for the language L is a struc-
ture M = 〈V,D, δ〉, where
• V is a non-empty set of truth values,
• D is a non-empty proper subset of V, the designated values,
• for every n-ary connective ∗ in the language, δ∗ : Vn → V is the truth function for ∗
A univalent interpretation is a pair 〈M,µ〉, where M is such a structure, and µ is an evaluation
function from the Prop to V. Given an interpretation, µ is extended to a map from all formu-
las to V recursively: µ(∗(α1, . . . , αn)) = δ∗(µ(α1), . . . , µ(αn)). Finally, Σ |=Mu α iff in every
interpretation in which all the formulas of Σ are designated, so is α.1
Note that semantic consequence relations are defined as preservation of designated values,
as usual. For an alternative, see Definitions 1.3 and 1.4.
Definition 1.2 The univalent semantics for Weak Kleene and Paraconsistent Weak Kleene for
the language L are the structures MKw3 = 〈VKw3 ,DKw3 , δKw3 〉, and MPWK = 〈VPWK,DPWK, δPWK〉
respectively where
• VKw3 = VPWK = {t, e, f},
1We will sometimes omit the subscript u, when contexts disambiguates. Also, we may sometimes make
reference of |=L instead of |=ML
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• DKw3 = {t} and DPWK = {t, e},
• δKw3 = δPWK and is the set of truth-functions represented by Kleene’s ‘weak’ truth-tables
from [19], depicted below.
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As is pointed out in [22], Kw3 can be understood as a logic with gaps endowed with a character-
ization of logical consequence in terms of truth-preservation, whereas PWK can be understood
as a logic with gaps endowed with a characterization of logical consequence in terms of non-falsity
preservation. The corresponding induced consequence relations being |=Kw3 and |=PWK.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that these possibilities do not exhaust the way in which
we can define logical consequence and, thus, in which we can build logical systems out of the
weak truth-tables from Kleene. We define below a q-consequence relation and a p-consequence
relation, following the proposals of Grzegorz Malinowksi in [20] and Szymon Frankowski in [17]
respectively.
Definition 1.3 (q-consequence for Kleene’s weak truth-tables) Σ |=WKq α iff in every
interpretation in which all the formulae of Σ are assigned a value in {t, e}, then α is assigned
the value t.
Definition 1.4 (p-consequence for Kleene’s weak truth-tables) Σ |=WKp α iff in every
interpretation in which all the formulae of Σ are assigned the value t, then α is assigned a value
in {t, e}.
2 Infectious logics: an overview
As we will briefly see, Weak Kleene and Paraconsistent Weak Kleene are members of a broader
family of infectious logics. Intuitively, infectious logics are many-valued logics that have an
absorbent or infectious truth-value, that is, a truth-value such that it is assigned to a compound
formula whenever it is assigned to at least one of its components. More formally:
Definition 2.1 A semantics M = 〈V,D, δ〉 for the language L is infectious iff there is an
element x ∈ V such that for every n-ary connective ∗ in the language, with an associated truth-
function δ∗ ∈ δ and for all v1, . . . , vn ∈ V it holds that: if x ∈ {v1, . . . , vn}, then δ∗(v1, . . . , vn) =
x
It is easy to see, as has been noticed in e.g. [29], that when the infectious value in question does
not belong to the set of designated values, then the logic is paracomplete. By this we mean
that there is a valuation such that both A and ¬A are undesignated. Moreover, in these cases,
yet another characteristic classical inference is invalid, namely ∨-Introduction (sometimes also
called ‘Addition’), i.e. ϕ  ϕ ∨ ψ. By this we mean that there is a valuation such that ϕ is
designated, but ϕ∨ψ is undesignated. This happens, particularly, when ψ receives the infectious
undesignated value in question.2
2Notice that this does not suggest that the infectious value does not belong to the set of designated values if
and only if the logic is paracomplete, for there might well exist paracomplete logics which do not count with an
infectious value at all, as in e.g. the well-known Strong Kleene logic K3 (cf. [19]).
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Additionally, it is also easy to see, as has been noticed in e.g. [29], that when the infectious
value in question belong to the set of designated values, then the logic is paraconsistent. By this
we mean that there is a valuation such that both A and ¬A are designated. Moreover, in these
cases, yet another characteristic classical inference is invalid, namely ∧-Elimination (sometimes
also called ‘Simplification’), i.e. ϕ∧ψ  ϕ. By this we mean that there is a valuation such that
ϕ ∧ ψ is designated, but ϕ is undesignated. This happens, particularly, when ψ receives the
infectious designated value in question.3
However, these logical behavior could be found to be rather odd and, for this reason, we
provide an overview of the philosophical motivations they have received in the literature, in the
next subsections. Let us notice that being faithful with the literature will require us reflecting
the fact that a considerable amount of motivations have been discussed with regard to the
paracomplete case, whereas only a few have been proposed for the paraconsistent case.4
2.1 Paracomplete case
Bochvar’s Logic of Nonsense. In the early decades of the last century, paradoxes of set theory
devoured the attention of many philosophers and logicians. The first conceptual motivation for
an infectious logic relates to these topics. Dmitri Bochvar developed in [5] a three-valued logic
to handle the paradoxes of set theory, like Russell’s Paradox (cf. [27]).
Bochvar’s own take on this issue was that the sentence describing such a paradoxical sets
was, properly speaking, meaningless or nonsensical and —as such— it did not deserve to be
regarded as either true or false. In more contemporary terms, we would say that Bochvar took
such sentences to be truth value gaps (cf. [27]).
More importantly, Bochvar was of the idea that sentences or statements containing a mean-
ingless part or subsentence must be, in turn, meaningless themselves. Thus, meaninglessness can
be legitimately described as the pathology from which paradoxical sentences suffered, which is
indeed itself literally infectious. Furthermore, since the meaninglessness of these very sentences
is portrayed by Bochvar via the assignment of the corresponding non-classical value we must
say that, in terms of Definition 2.1, the meaningless value is infectious.
These motivations led Bochvar to devise his ‘logic of nonsense’, which besides the “classical”
connectives, has also means to mark nonsensical or meaningless statements. The ‘external
assertion’ operator acts like a characteristic function for true statements, i.e. statements assigned
the value and, therefore, not assigned the value false, or the meaningless value. To be precise,
then, it is only the {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of Bochvar’s logic of nonsense that represents an infectious
logic (also found in the literature as Weak Kleene Logic Kw3 , on which more below).
Finally, Bochvar took logical consequence as being characterized by truth-preservation. That
is, necessarily, if the premises are true, the conclusion is true. But, again, if meaningless sentences
are neither true nor false, then an inference with true premises but a meaningless conclusion
must be invalid. This is why, by taking e.g. ϕ to be true and ψ to be meaningless, ∨-Introduction
fails.
Fitting’s Epistemic Interpretation. With the intention of applying his project (see e.g.
[16]) of providing an epistemic interpretation for Kleene logics (cf. [19]) and Belnap-Dunn four-
3Analogous to the previous footnote, notice that this does not suggest that the infectious value does belong
to the set of designated values if and only if the logic is paraconsistent, for there might well exist paraconsistent
logics which do not count with an infectious value at all, as in e.g. the Logic of Paradox due to Priest (cf. [27]).
4We should remark that providing a full overview of these motivations will require much more space than
we have here. For that reason, we refrained from commenting on some of the motivations for infectious logics,
e.g. (the first degree of) Parry systems (cf. [25]) and of Epstein’s Dependence and Dual Dependence systems
(cf. [11]) discussed in e.g. [23, 24, 12, 14, 13], Deutsch’s logic from [9], Daniels’ logic from [7], and Priest’s logic
FDEϕ from [28].
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valued logic FDE, Melvin Fitting provided in [15] an epistemic interpretation for Kw3 . For
this purpose, he recurred to the framework present in e.g. [16], where there is a set of experts
expressing their positive and negative opinion on different issues, represented by sentences ϕ,ψ,
etc. In his discussion, and taking ϕ as an example, Fitting thought of allowing experts to be for
(and not against) ϕ, or both for and against ϕ, or neither for nor against ϕ, or against (and not
for) ϕ. These four cases correspond, respectively, (via a suitable translation) to the four values
{t,b,n, f} of FDE.
In this framework, it is possible to ask (when all experts have made their minds about the
relevant issues) which is e.g. the set of experts that are in favor of ϕ∨ψ. In this case, we might
think of the union of those in favor of ϕ and those in favor of ψ. However, Fitting notices that
in some situations of this sort we might want to cut-down the set of experts taken into account
to those who have actually expressed an opinion towards both ϕ and ψ. That is, there can be
some situations (Fitting argues) where we may not want to count an expert as being in favor
of ϕ ∨ ψ, if she has no opinion at all with regard to e.g. ψ. In those cases we are interested,
in Fitting’s terminology, in a ‘cut-down’ disjunction. (And, by similar remarks, in a ‘cut-down’
negation and a ‘cut-down’ conjunction).
The failure of ∨-Introduction is, thus, properly understood in epistemic terms by taking
disjunction as cut-down disjunction. It is not the case that from e.g. the fact that all experts
are in favor of ϕ it follows that all experts are in favor of ϕ ∨ ψ, for some experts may have no
opinion whatsoever with regard to ψ. If we, additionally, are in a situation where no expert is
both in favor and against a certain issue (that is, if no sentence is assigned the truth-value b),
the logic induced by these cut-down operations is, precisely, Kw3 .
Ferguson’s Computational Interpretation. In [12] Thomas Ferguson advances a compu-
tational reading of some paracomplete infectious logics by following Belnap’s classical remarks
about how a computer should think (cf. [4]), using FDE. Belnap motivates his system by
considering a computer retrieving information about certain sentences, where this information
can be thought as the truth-value that —the computer is told— the given sentences have. Bel-
nap imagines that, with regard to e.g. ϕ, the computer can be told, i.e. it can retrieve the
information that ϕ is true, or that ϕ is false, or both, or neither.5
Ferguson’s ‘faulty computer’ approach to infectious logics focuses on the idea that a computer
may fail to retrieve the value of a given sentence. He notices, moreover, that this case must me
taken to be essentially different from that where the computer is able to retrieve the value of ϕ,
but it encounters no information regarding its truth or its falsity. The case of a failure retrieving
the target value, possibly caused by a memory crash, a physical malfunction, or other problem,
is thus different from the case of a successful retrieving attempt, accompanied by the fact that
the target value contains no information.
Failures, in Ferguson’s approach, must be represented (in an extension of FDE) by a fifth
value, behaving infectiously and being undesignated. In such a case, ∨-Introduction is invalid,
for —although a computer might be successful in retrieving the value of ϕ and, additionally,
being told that it is true— it might encounter a critical error or a crash while retrieving the
value of ψ and, therefore, an error while retrieving the value of ϕ ∨ ψ.6
Beall’s Off-Topic Interpretation. In [2], Jc Beall proposes an alternative interpretation for
Weak Kleene Logic, which does not appeal to meaninglessness, as Bochvar’s does. Beall focuses
on theories formulated in English (or any other natural language). Theories have a distinctive
topic, that is, they are not about everything, namely, about every concept expressible in English.
5As is noted in [12], while this framework is regarded as a ‘single address’ approach to Belnap computers, a
‘two address’ approach can also motivated, with the subtlety that it induces a weaker nine-valued logic.
6We shall also mention that in [14] Ferguson discusses another computational interpretation related to Mc-
Carthy’s logic from [21].
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Intuitively, color theory is about colors, arithmetic is about numbers, and so on and so forth,
but color theory is not about numbers and arithmetic is not about colors. To these assumptions
Beall adds the intuitive thesis that ϕ ∨ ψ is about what ϕ is about and about what ψ is about,
and similarly for ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ.
But this is not all that can be said about theories. Theories, the standard view goes, are
sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. But the main question is: which logic? Beall
remarks that it cannot be a logic that validates ∨-Introduction. For, if that is the case, then any
theory that is about what ϕ is about, will end up being also about what ψ is about, even if ψ
is completely off-topic. But this is unintuitive, for then theories will be about every everything,
that is, about every concept expressible in English.
To this extent, Beall proposes that the logic under which theories should be closed should
be Weak Kleene. By doing this, he also proposes to interpret the infectious value as off-topic,
thereby understanding validity as on-topic truth preservation. It is easy to see how this inval-
idates ∨-Introduction, for even if ϕ and ψ are both true, ϕ might well be on-topic while ψ is
not. Therefore, ϕ ∨ ψ will be true, although off-topic, whence the failure of the corresponding
inference.
2.2 Paraconsistent case
Hallde´n’s Logic of Nonsense. In a similar path than Bochvar, we can find Hallde´n’s own
‘logic of nonsense’, developed mainly in [18]. Besides the usual set-theoretic paradoxes, Hallde´n
also finds instances of meaningless or nonsensical sentences involved in paradoxes of vagueness
(cf. [27]). Again, just like Bochvar, Hallde´n takes meaningless or nonsensical statements to be
neither true nor false, and therefore to be truth-value gaps. Hallde´n also shares the idea that
meaninglessness is an infectious feature.
These motivations led him, in turn, to conceive his own ‘logic of nonsense’, which besides the
usual logical connectives ¬,∧,∨, has a ‘meaningfulness operator’ that acts like a characteristic
function for meaningful statements, i.e. statements assigned either truth or falsity. To be
precise, then, it is only the {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of Hallde´n’s logic of nonsense that represents an
infectious logic (also found in the literature as PWK, on which more below).
Bochvar and Hallde´n’s logics of nonsense have, nevertheless, an important difference. Whereas
the first is paracomplete, the latter is paraconsistent. Formally speaking, this means that the
truth-value assigned to meaningless sentences is regarded as designated. Thus, there are sen-
tences A (namely, meaningless sentences and sentences containing meaningless statements as
subsentences) such that both A and ¬A are designated.
With regard to this, while it is argued in [6] that these renders the meaningless value as being
truth-like, a more comprehensive understanding of this feature can be taken into account if we
notice that paraconsistency, in Hallde´n’s case, is a derivative phenomenon. This means that
Hallde´n did not think of nonsensical sentences as being both true and false, i.e. as truth-value
gluts (cf. [27]), much to the contrary he took them to neither true nor false.
The paraconsistent nature of the induced consequence relation is, therefore, better under-
stood if we point out (as [12, p. 345] and [22] do) that Hallde´n should be regarded as taking
validity to be characterized by (forwards) non-falsity preservation, that is, if the premises are
non-false, then the conclusion is non-false —instead of the usual (forwards) truth-preservation.7
In this vein, if meaningless sentences are neither true nor false, then an inference with meaning-
less premises but a false conclusion must be invalid. This is why, by taking e.g. ϕ to be false
and ψ to be meaningless, ∧-Elimination fails.
7Non-falsity preservation as a motivation for paraconsistency in ‘gappy’ contexts is discussed in e.g. [3, 1].
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Dualizing Fitting’s Epistemic Interpretation.8 It is possible to conceive two dualizations
of Fitting’s epistemic understanding of Weak Kleene logic Kw3 , which will provide an epistemic
interpretation of a our target paraconsistent infectious logic, namely, PWK. The first one takes
the entire framework of Fitting’s cut-down operations, but changes the way the consequence
relation is defined. Instead of taking validity to be defined by truth-preservation, we change to
define it as non-falsity preservation. By this we mean that an inference is valid if and only if
if the premises are not taken to be false by all the experts, then the conclusion is not taken to
be false by all the experts. In such cases, the failure of ∧-Elimination is properly understood
in epistemic terms by taking conjunction as cut-down conjunction. Imagine a situation where
all experts have no opinion towards ϕ: in such a situation it is not the case that from e.g. the
fact that all experts have no opinion towards ϕ ∧ ψ it follows that all experts have no opinion
towards ψ, for all experts may have a negative opinion towards ψ. If we, additionally, are in a
situation where no expert is both in favor and against a certain issue (that is, if no sentence is
assigned the truth-value b), the logic induced by these cut-down operations, taking validity to
be defined by non-falsity preservation, is precisely PWK.
Alternatively, we could take Fitting’s epistemic understanding of FDE and build a different
interpretation for PWK. Again, in this framework, it is possible to ask (when all experts have
made their minds about the relevant issues) which is e.g. the set of experts that are in favor of
ϕ∧ψ. In this case, we might think of the intersection of those in favor of ϕ and those in favor of
ψ. However, we might be interested in some situations of this sort we might want to track-down
those experts who have actually expressed an inconsistent opinion towards either ϕ or ψ. That
is, there can be some situations where we may not want to count an expert as having a consistent
opinion towards e.g. ϕ∧ ψ, if she has an inconsistent opinion towards e.g. ψ. In those cases we
are interested, in analogy with Fitting’s terminology, in a ‘track-down’ disjunction. (And, by
similar remarks, in a ‘track-down’ negation and a ‘track-down’ conjunction).
Now, imagine a situation where all experts have a negative opinion towards ϕ and all experts
have an inconsistent opinion towards ψ —i.e. they are both for and against ψ. Thus, following
the track-down policy we would say that all experts have, therefore, an inconsistent opinion
towards ϕ∧ψ. The failure of ∧-Elimination is, thus, properly understood in epistemic terms by
taking conjunction as track-down conjunction. In such a situation, it is not the case that from
e.g. the fact that all experts are both in favor and against of ϕ∧ψ it follows that all experts are
in favor of ϕ, for experts may be both for and against the conjunction just because they have an
inconsistent opinion towards ψ. If we, additionally, are in a situation where no expert is silent
regarding all issues (that is, if no sentence is assigned the truth-value n), the logic induced by
these track-down operations is, precisely, PWK.
3 Plurivalent semantics: basics
We would like to remark that, even if all of the above formalisms involve infectious connectives
that are referred in their respective contexts as conjunction and disjunction, it is never discussed
in these works if the target operations are actual conjunctions and disjunctions, or what makes
them be so.
Our discussion in the sections to come is intended to answer this question, by looking at the
truth and falsity conditions of conjunction and disjunction. We will do this within the framework
of plurivalent logics developed by Priest in [29]. Plurivalent logics and their semantics can be
8Unlike the previous interpretations of both the paracomplete and the paraconsistent infectious systems, the
following account is our original thought. We would like to thank one of the reviewers for the suggestion to
develop further the epistemic readings of infectious logics. For a full technical development of these ideas, see
[30].
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thought as an alternative way to look at logical frameworks where instead of a formula’s single
truth-value coming from an arbitrary set, it is allowed for formulae to have more than one
truth-value, from a given set. Thus, for example, a setting in which each formulae gets, as a
truth-value, a single element of {t, e, f}, can also be represented in a setting in which every
formulae gets, as a truth-value, a subset of {t, f}.
The definitions and results in the first three subsections are all given by Priest in [29] in
which proofs are fully spelled out. Moreover, the definitions and results in the last subsection
can be found in [22]. Therefore, the results in this section are stated without proofs. Note finally,
that our notation as well as the order of the presentation are slightly different from Priest’s.9
3.1 General plurivalent semantics.
We begin with the most general case of plurivalent semantics.
Definition 3.1 (General plurivalent semantics) Given a univalent interpretation, the cor-
responding general plurivalent interpretation is the same, except that it replaces the evaluation
function, µ, with a one-many evaluation relation, R, between Prop and V. Given an interpre-
tation, R is extended to a map from Form to V recursively:
∗(α1, . . . , αn)Rv iff for some v1, . . . , vn: (αiRvi and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn))
Finally, Σ |=Mg α iff for all R, if R designates all the formulas of Σ then R designates α, where
R designates α iff αRv for some v ∈ D.
Then, we can again prove a general relation between the univalent semantics and general
plurivalent semantics. To this end, we need the following definition.
Definition 3.2 Let M = 〈V,D, δ〉 be a univalent semantics. Then we can define a univalent
semantics M¨ = 〈V¨, D¨, δ¨〉, where V¨ = 2V , D¨ = {v¨ ∈ V¨ : v ∈ v¨ for some v ∈ D} and
v ∈ δ¨∗(v¨1, . . . , v¨n) iff for some v1, . . . , vn : (vi ∈ v¨i and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn)).
Proposition 3.3 Given any univalent semantics M = 〈V,D, δ〉, its corresponding general pluri-
valent semantics can be seen as a univalent semantics M¨ = 〈V¨, D¨, δ¨〉, i.e. for any Σ ∪ {α}:
Σ |=Mg α iff Σ |=M¨u α
3.2 Positive plurivalent semantics.
We now turn to the positive plurivalent semantics, which is obtained by adding a constraint to
the general plruvialent semantics. Note that the original idea behind the general construction
can be found already in [26].
Definition 3.4 (Positive plurivalent semantics) Given a univalent interpretation, the cor-
responding positive plurivalent interpretation is the same, except that it replaces the evaluation
function, µ, with a one-many evaluation relation, R, between Prop and V with the following
positivity condition:
for every p ∈ Prop: pRv form some v ∈ V
Given an interpretation, R is extended to a map from Form to V recursively:
9We would like to thank one of the reviewers for the suggestion to restructure the presentation of plurivalent
semantics.
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∗(α1, . . . , αn)Rv iff for some v1, . . . , vn: (αiRvi and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn))
Finally, Σ |=Mp α iff for all R, if R designates all the formulas of Σ then R designates α, where
R designates α iff αRv for some v ∈ D.
Then, we can prove a general relation between the two semantics. To state the result, the
following definition will be useful.
Definition 3.5 Let M = 〈V,D, δ〉 be a univalent semantics. Then we can define a univalent
semantics M˙ = 〈V˙, D˙, δ˙〉, where V˙ = 2V\∅, D˙ = {v˙ ∈ V˙ : v ∈ v˙ for some v ∈ D} and
v ∈ δ˙∗(v˙1, . . . , v˙n) iff for some v1, . . . , vn : (vi ∈ v˙i and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn)).
Proposition 3.6 Given any univalent semantics M = 〈V,D, δ〉, its corresponding positive
plurivalent semantics can be seen as a univalent semantics M˙ = 〈V˙, D˙, δ˙〉, i.e. for any Σ∪ {α}:
Σ |=Mp α iff Σ |=M˙u α
Remark 3.7 Let us notice, in passing, that until now our discussion of plurivalent logics has
been mainly focused on logical consequence as preservation of “receiving at least one univalently
designated value”. But that is not the only way, as we can also think of preservation of “not
receiving any univalently undesignated value”, and more.10
Once we obtain the plurivalent semantics, we can also characterize the general plurivalent
semantic consequence relation in terms of positive plurivalence.
Definition 3.8 Let M = 〈V,D, δ〉 be a univalent semantics. Then we can define a univalent
semantics Me = 〈Ve,De, δe〉, where: Ve = V ∪ {e}, De = D, and δe∗(ve1, . . . , ven) = e iff vei = e
for some vei ∈ Ve. Otherwise, δe∗ = δ∗.
Proposition 3.9 Let M be a univalent semantics. Then, for any Σ∪{α}: Σ |=Mg α iff Σ |=M
e
p
α.
So far we have been looking at the general framework of plurivalent semantics. Here are
some examples, obtained by applying plurivalence to the FDE family.
Definition 3.10 Let M=〈V,D, δ〉 be a univalent semantics. Then we define a univalent se-
mantics M b=〈Vb,Db, δb〉, where: Vb=V ∪ {b}, Db=D ∪ {b}, and δb∗=δ∗
Theorem 3.11 Let M be a univalent semantics of the FDE family. Then for any Σ ∪ {α},
the following hold: Σ |=Mp α iff Σ |=M
b
u α, and Σ |=Mg α iff Σ |=M
e,b
u α
3.3 Yet another plurivalent semantics: negative plurivalence
As is well known, Michael Dunn’s discovery in [10] offered an intuitive reading of the truth
values in the family of FDE. Seen in this way, Priest’s plurivalent semantics offers yet another
way of making sense of truth values in terms of smaller number of truth values. But Priest’s
construction given in [29] did not give any clue to make sense of Weak Kleene Logic and its
paraconsistent variant. It turns out, however, that by considering a rather natural variant of
Priest’s construction, we obtain an intuitive reading of the truth values for those logics.
10As an anonymous reviewer points out, since univalently designated values need not be identified with truth,
preserving designated values from premises to conclusion, does not collapse with truth-preservation (namely, the
preservation of the value t).
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Definition 3.12 (Negative plurivalent semantics) Given a univalent interpretation, the
corresponding negative plurivalent interpretation is the same, except that it replaces the evalua-
tion function, µ, with a one-many evaluation relation, R, between Prop and V with the following
negativity condition:
for every p ∈ Prop: it is not the case that pRv for all v ∈ V
Given an interpretation, R is extended to a map from Form to V recursively:
∗(α1, . . . , αn)Rv iff for some v1, . . . , vn: (αiRvi and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn))
Finally, we have two definitions of logical consequence in this setting: truth-preservation and
non-falsity preservation. In the former case we will say that Σ |=Mn α iff for all R, if R designates
all the formulas of Σ then R designates α, where R designates α iff αRv for some v ∈ D. For
the latter we will say that Σ |=Mn α iff for all R, if R designates all the formulas of Σ then R
designates α, where R designates α iff it is not the case that αRv for some v /∈ D.
Then, we can again prove a relation between the univalent semantics and negative plurivalent
semantics, but the only case that is allowed for the univalent semantics is the two-valued matrix
for classical logic. As [22] shows, negative plurivalence does not define a plurivalent consequence
relation if some other matrices from the FDE family are taken as the basis. To state the
result, the following definition will be useful —alternatively changing the definition of
...D to...D = {...v ∈ ...V : v /∈ v¨ for all v /∈ D} for the non-falsity preservation case.
Definition 3.13 Let M = 〈V,D, δ〉 be the univalent semantics for classical logic. Then we
can define a univalent semantics
...
M = 〈...V , ...D, δ˙〉, where ...V = 2V \ V, ...D = {...v ∈ ...V : v ∈
v¨ for some v ∈ D} and
v ∈ ...δ∗(...v1, . . . , ...vn) iff for some v1, . . . , vn : (vi ∈ ...vi and v = δ∗(v1, . . . , vn)).
Proposition 3.14 Let M be a univalent semantics for classical logic. Then, for any Σ ∪ {α}:
Σ |=
...
M
u α iff Σ |=K
w
3 α.
4 Reflections
4.1 On Infectious Values in Plurivalent Semantics
In the context of both the general and negative plurivalence, following the definitions suggested
by Priest, infectious values can only be represented by the empty set. This is remarkably so,
even if we start with univalent semantics other than two-valued classical logic, e.g. the three-
valued univalent semantics for Kw3 , or even FDE. If we, additionally, think of a truth-value x
as being true if t ∈ x, and respectively as being false if f ∈ x, then it is clear that being true or
being false implies being non-infectious.11
It is for these reasons that if we apply the generalized plurivalence to the e.g. two-valued uni-
valent semantics for classical logic, infectious values cannot be represented with —for instance—
the full set {t, f}. We would like to mention, though, that as a remark made by an anonymous
reviewer suggests, it will be interesting to discuss definitions of the plurivalent semantics that
deviate from Priest’s, in order to determine whether or not there is a plurivalent-like setting
where, for instance, the full set {t, f} can represent an infectious value. However, we notice that
there is no such thing present in the literature, up to now.
11Although for an alternative, see [30], where designated infectious values are understood as truth-value gluts,
i.e. as both-true-and-false.
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4.2 Addressing the main question
In what follows we will present an account of the truth conditions for conjunction and disjunction
in the context of plurivalent logics which applies both to general plurivalence and negative
plurivalence —something that we take to be an advantage of the present discussion.
In the context of infectious logics, interpreted along the lines of §2, these operations are
characterized by the following truth conditions:
ϕ ∧ ψ is true iff ϕ and ψ are true, and condition C applies to ϕ and ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ is true iff ϕ or ψ are true, and condition C applies to ϕ and ψ
where by ‘condition C applies to ϕ and ψ’ we mean, respectively, that these sentences are
meaningful (in Bochvar’s and Hallde´n’s case), that all experts have expressed an opinion toward
these sentences (in Fitting’s case), that the computer was successful in retrieving the information
with regard to these sentences (in Ferguson’s case) and that these sentences are on-topic (in
Beall’s case).
Remark 4.1 Since truth-values in the plurivalent framework are represented as subsets of some
set of univalent truth-values, this implies that the curly brackets act as a meaningful operator (if
we take into account Bochvar’s and Hallde´n’s interpretation), or as a did-expressed-an-opinion
operator (if we take into account Fitting’s interpretation), or as a successful-in-retrieving value
operator (if we take into account Ferguson’s interpretation), or as an on-topic operator (if we
take into account Beall’s interpretation).
On the more conservative side, the traditional account of conjunction has it that a conjunc-
tion is true iff both conjuncts are true, whereas the traditional account of disjunction has it
that a disjunction is true iff at least one of both disjunctions is true. We will see, through some
technical remarks, that this understanding of conjunction is respected in the plurivalent reading
of infectious logics, whence we can legitimately say that the operator called ‘conjunction’ in the
context of infectious logic is conjunction. However, the standard understanding of disjunction
is not respected in the plurivalent reading of infectious logics, whence we can legitimately say
that the operator called ‘disjunction’ in the context of infectious logics is not disjunction.12
By the truth condition for conjunction in the plurivalent semantics, we have:
t ∈ δ¨∧(x, y) iff ∃x0,∃y0 ∈ {t, f} : [x0 ∈ x, y0 ∈ y and δ∧(x0, y0) = t].
But the fact that δ∧(x0, y0) = t, given the definition of δ∧ entails that x0 = t and y0 = t,
further implying that none of them is the empty set. Thus we have:
t ∈ δ¨∧(x, y) iff t ∈ x and t ∈ y.
From this we infer that conjunction, in the context of infectious logics represented within the
plurivalent semantics, is conjunction, as traditionally conceived.
However, we cannot say the same about disjunction, as we now turn to show. By the truth
condition for disjunction in the plurivalent semantics, we have:
t ∈ δ¨∨(x, y) iff ∃x0,∃y0 ∈ {t, f} : [x0 ∈ x, y0 ∈ y and δ∨(x0, y0) = t].
Nevertheless, the fact that δ∨(x0, y0) = t, given the definition of δ∨ does not entail that both
x0, y0 ∈ {t, f}, i.e. it does not imply that none of them is the empty set. From which we
12Notice that we took the notational liberty of using e.g. δ¨∧ as the paradigmatic case, but nothing really
depends on this, and
...
δ ∧ might be used as well, without any loss.
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can infer that disjunction, in the context of infectious logics represented within the plurivalent
semantics, is not disjunction, as traditionally conceived.
Let us notice, for some readers might be concerned with the case, that negation (as present in
infectious logics represented within plurivalent semantics) is negation as traditionally conceived,
that is, it is an operator that flip-flops truth and falsity.13
To conclude, we should highlight that the previous remarks about the degree to which the
operators called conjunction and disjunction in infectious logics are legitimately called that way
did not make any reference to the validity of inference rules or principles where those connectives
are features, e.g. of the already mentioned cases of ∧-Elimination and ∨-Introduction.
We would like to point out that those are issues that essentially concern the definition of
validity. Whether we do that in terms of truth-preservation, or in terms of non-falsity preser-
vation, in terms of q-consequence (cf. [20]) or p-consequence (cf. [17]), following its specific
instances defined in §2, the inferences that are going to be valid or invalid vary, as summarized
below.
|=Kw3 |=PWK |=WKq |=WKp
ψ |= ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ × X × X
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |= ψ X × × X
ϕ |= ϕ ∨ ψ × X × X
ϕ ∧ ψ |= ϕ X × × X
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the extent to which conjunction and disjunction can be rightfully
regarded as logical connectives of those particular sorts, in the context of infectious logics. By
turning to the analysis of the truth-conditions for these connectives, employing the framework
of plurivalent logics, we arrived at the conclusion that —in the context of infectious logics—
conjunction is conjunction, whereas disjunction is not disjunction in the context of infectious
logics.
There are a number of directions in which further work related to infectious logics and
plurivalent logics can be carried out. Regarding the most prominent and historically salient
interpretations of infectious logics, in terms of the ‘logics of nonsense’ due to Bochvar and
Hallde´n, it will be worth exploring the possibility of defining the semantics of a proper meaningful
operator within the plurivalent framework. Both Bochvar and Hallde´n’s logics count with such
linguistic devices, although in this work we focused mainly on the {¬,∧,∨}-fragment of their
systems. We leave these and other discussions for a subsequent paper.
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